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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-3508 
 ___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CHARLES AARON BROOKS, 
 
Appellant 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Criminal No. 2-95-cr-00564-001) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Harvey Bartle III 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
 Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 14, 2011 
 Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN AND VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  November 4, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Charles Brooks is a federal prisoner, who was convicted in 1996 for his part in a 
series of armed bank robberies.  He appeals several District Court orders that denied: 1) a 
motion for “all documents related” to his criminal case, and specifically “a true and 
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complete copy of all discovery” relating to various witnesses, ECF No. 278 (denied by 
ECF No. 279); 2) a timely filed motion to reconsider the denial of his discovery request, 
ECF No. 280 (denied by ECF No. 281); 3) a “Motion to Dismiss Superseding Indictment 
for Violating Defendant[’s] Speedy Trial Rights,” ECF No. 288 (denied by ECF No. 
295); 4) a timely filed motion to reconsider the speedy-trial denial, ECF No. 297 (denied 
by ECF No. 302); 5) a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for documents, ECF 
No. 283 (denied by ECF No. 287); 6) a timely filed motion to reconsider the denial of his 
FOIA request, ECF No. 289 (denied by ECF No. 292); 7) a motion for recusal of the 
presiding District Court Judge, the Honorable Harvey Bartle III, ECF No. 291 (denied by 
ECF No. 293); and 8) a “Motion and Affidavit Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 255 
Disqualification of a Judge Should Be Granted,” ECF No. 298 (denied by ECF No. 301).1
 We must first determine whether our jurisdiction extends to all of the 
abovementioned orders, which in turn depends on whether they are subject to the rules 
controlling civil (Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)) or criminal (Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)) appeals.  We 
have previously held that Fed. R. App. P. 4(b), which governs appeals “in a criminal 
case”—and whose relevant prescribed time limit, fourteen days, is not jurisdictional, see 
Gov’t of V.I. v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 2010)— is “construed narrowly to 
encompass only a prosecution brought by the government to secure a sentence of 
 
                                                 
1 Brooks, who proceeds pro se, simultaneously pursued an appeal from the denial of his 
motion to return property under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g).  See United States v. Brooks, 
C.A. No. 11-3235.  We gave his basic allegations the scrutiny they deserved therein and 
will not repeat ourselves here.  
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conviction for criminal conduct.”  United States v. Lavin, 942 F.2d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 
1991) (internal citations & quotations omitted).  By contrast, the ambit of Rule 4(a)’s 
“civil case” designation is far broader, covering proceedings (such as habeas corpus 
petitions and, in Lavin itself, forfeiture proceedings under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)) that 
may arise out of a previous criminal prosecution.  Id. at 181–82; see also Impounded, 277 
F.3d 407, 411 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that, when “proceedings on [a] motion were clearly 
not proceedings by the government to secure a sentence of conviction for criminal 
conduct,” the proceedings were “civil” and not “criminal” for the purposes of Rule 4).  
As the time for criminal prosecution has long since passed, Brooks’s post-trial motions 
are akin to those cast as “civil” in Lavin, and are therefore subject to the time limits of 
Rule 4(a)—which, as jurisdictional limits, are not subject to equitable modification, see 
Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).  We consequently lack jurisdiction to reach 
the District Court orders denying Brooks’s initial discovery request and his related 
motion for reconsideration—entered on January 25, 2011, and February 14, 2011, 
respectively—which were not appealed within the sixty days allowed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 
4(a)(1)(B).     
 With regard to the remaining orders, over which we exercise our 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
jurisdiction,2
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 we will leave the District Court’s judgment undisturbed.  Construing 
2 All of Brooks’s remaining motions were either appealed within the sixty days allotted—
for example, the order denying Brook’s speedy-trial motion was entered on July 18, 
2011, fewer than sixty days before the September 6, 2011, notice of appeal—or were the 
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Brooks’s FOIA request as an attempt to gain further post-trial discovery, we note that “an 
application for relief under the discovery rules is a matter within the sound discretion of 
the district court and its ruling will be disturbed only for an abuse of discretion.”  United 
States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 410 (3d Cir. 1969); see also United States v. Webster, 
162 F.3d 308, 337 (5th Cir. 1998) (applying the same standard to post-conviction 
discovery requests).  Throughout his confusing submissions, Brooks showed no 
entitlement to discovery at this late date; in fact, he appeared to admit that the material he 
now requests was available to his attorney at trial.  Nor does FOIA otherwise expand the 
scope of discovery available in a criminal case.  United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 717 F.2d 
478, 480 (9th Cir. 1983).  To the extent that Brooks’s motions (e.g., his belated speedy-
trial motion) attacked the basis of his federal conviction and sentence, he was required to 
proceed via 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1997).  
Finally, with regard to Brooks’s requests for recusal, we see no reason why Judge Bartle 
should have recused himself.  Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 
273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000); Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1356 (3d Cir. 
1990).  Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brooks’s 
motions for reconsideration.  United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 732 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 In sum, “[b]ecause this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.”  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 2011 
                                                                                                                                                             
subject of a timely filed motion for reconsideration from which the appeal was timely 
taken.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)(4)(A). 
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WL 2279428, at *1 (3d Cir. June 10, 2011, No. 10-4397); see also 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 
I.O.P. 10.6.  To the extent that it requests independent relief, Brooks’s “Motion to Appeal 
Court to Clarify Matters” is denied. 
